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ABSTRACT 
 
Recent corporate failures in the Nigerian Financial Sector and the resultant effect on the market performance of 
listed firms necessitated the review of the existing codes of corporate governance in Nigeria. The research study 
therefore explored the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and market performance using four 
corporate governance mechanisms variables as reviewed in the SEC Code 2011 and four market performance 
variables. The four independent variables are audit committee independence, audit committee financial expertise, 
board independence and ownership structure while the market performance indicators are Share Price (SP), 
Volume of Trade (VOT), Market Capitalization (MC) and Earnings per Share (EPS). Empirical analysis was 
carried using correlation, regression and two independent T-tests. The result showed that there is a positive 
significant impact of audit committee independence, audit committee financial expertise, board independence as 
revised in the SEC Code 2011 on SP, VOT, MC and EPS. This study recommends that there is need for Policy 
makers to strengthen the implementation of every recommendation contains in the SEC Code 2011 to further 
stabilize the performance of listed firms and also repose the confidence of investors both local and foreign investors 
in the capital market. It is recommended that the provisions as contained in the SEC Code 2011 be backed up by 
law to ensure strict compliance. 
 
JEL Classification: M40; M41; M42. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has become a very critical issue in the running of business organizations (Adbullahi, 
Enyinna, & Stella, 2010). There were times when the issue of corporate governance could not attract more than a 
casual look. The recent happenings around the world and in Nigeria especially (collapse of energy corporation 
Enron in 2001 in US, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Rank Xerox, Cadbury and some banks in Nigeria) have called 
for closer looks at the tenets and the practice of corporate governance in the system. These include transparency, 
accountability, responsibility, integrity, independence and discipline. Nigerian has had her fair share in the 
business failures which have brought many firms and countries’ economies almost to its knees. The recent and 
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vivid examples in Nigeria are the failures in the banking system which snowballed into near crash of the capital 
market. 
 
These failures led to the removal of eight Chief Executive Offices (hereafter CEOs) and the sacking of some boards 
by the then governor of the apex bank in Nigeria. The overall effect was seeing in the plummeting of share prices, 
reduction in trade volume of shares and loss of earnings in the capital market with billions of naira worth of 
investments lost. Sanusi (2010) maintained that weak corporate governance and regulatory framework was 
responsible for the corporate failures in Nigeria. The SEC Code 2003 was clearly seen as ineffective in preventing 
corporate failures. Hence, there was an urgent need by the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission 
(hereafter SEC) to review the 2003 Code of Corporate Governance. The reform of the 2003 code led to the 
emergency of SEC Code 2011 to address issues that rendered the previous code ‘ineffective’. Prior to the review 
of 2003 SEC Code of Corporate Governance, the weakness and constraints to good corporate governance were 
identified. Some of the identified weaknesses were inadequate oversight, various litigations, and allegations of 
financial mismanagement, weak corporate governance characteristics and regulatory framework.  
 
The limitations discovered from the 2003 SEC code led to the 2011 SEC code of corporate governance. The 2011 
SEC Code addresses some important areas that can strengthen the tenets of corporate governance such as making 
the board more effective and independent in term of number of non-executive directors, establishing 
whistleblowers policies, expanding the scope and functions of the audit committee, its independence and the 
compulsory inclusion of an accounting and financial expert on the board and at least one independent director on 
the board. These areas were not elaborately covered in the SEC Code 2003. For example, there was no provision 
of an accounting expert as a member of the board, the audit committee was not saddled with assessment of risk, 
and there could be executive directors on the audit committee board and no provision for whistleblowers. The new 
code is seen as an improvement. However, the question is, to what extent has the 2011 SEC code of corporate 
governance improved the market performance of listed companies in Nigeria?. That is, what is the impact of this 
code on the share prices, volume of trade, market capitalization and earnings per share?  Has this code restored the 
confidence of investors (that was once eroded) in the capital market?. 
 
Attempts have been made by various researchers in Nigeria on some of the reforms in the 2011 code of corporate 
governance and financial performance, financial reporting quality and audit quality (see Mohammed & Oladele, 
2008; Owolabi and Ogbecie, 2010; Ojeka, Iyoha and Obigbemi, 2014; Ojeka, Iyoha and Ikpefan, 2014; Ojeka, 
Iyoha & Asaolu, 2015). However, none has considered the overall effect of critical provisions in the SEC Code 
2011 on the market performance of firms in the Nigerian Capital Market after the code came to effect since year 
2011. The indicators for market performance in this study are share price, market capitalization, earnings per share 
and volume of trade. This research contribute to extant literature especially in Nigeria in the sense that, it is the 
first research work that will attempt to look at the effect of critical adjustments in the SEC Code 2011 on firm’s 
market performance in Nigeria and the extent to which investors lost confidence in the Nigerian capital market has 
been restored. The remaining part of the paper is sub-divided into section 2 which talks about the literature and 
hypotheses development whereas the part 3, part 4 and part 5 talk about the methodology, the analysis and 
implications of findings and part 5, the conclusion and recommendations. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Discussion 
 
Corporate governance is an act of doing business and doing it well with utmost integrity and commitment towards 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth and the interests of other concerned stakeholders.  It is ensuring that, the trust of 
the various stakeholders in committing their resources into the care of the board and the management is protected. 
It is considered essentially as balancing the interests of many stakeholders in a company which include 
shareholders, management, customers, suppliers, financiers, government and the community. Since corporate 
governance also provides the framework for attaining a company's objectives, it encompasses practically every 
sphere of management, from action plans and internal controls to performance measurement and corporate 
disclosure. However, there are instances whereby this trust has been violated by the very agents saddled with the 
responsibility of ensuring good governance and protecting the interests of the principal, hence the need to put 
measure in place to safeguard various interests and concerns. This measure is the code of corporate governance.  
 
In Nigeria, before the recapitalization exercise by the Nigerian banks, the SEC Code 2003 was put in place to 
ensure good and professional management of the sourced funds from the public. However, by year 2010 during 
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the period of financial recession/meltdown, most of the firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange collapsed in 
term of share prices and volume of trade. As a result, a review was carried out by the Central Bank of Nigeria, and 
was discovered that majority of those firms had a very weak corporate governance practices. This was evident in 
overvaluation and concealment of level of indebtedness by some companies and the collapse of some banks (Oteh, 
2013). As a matter of fact, some of those firms especially in the banking sector had their management especially 
the Chief Executive Officers (hereafter CEOs) removed. Many of Chief CEOs were not prepared intellectually for 
the huge shareholders’ fund at their disposal and there was flagrant abuse of corporate governance. The SEC Code 
2003 was discovered generally weak to address the issue s of management financial recklessness. For example, 
there was an existence of board duality, visible percentage of family members on the board, weak internal control, 
and CEOs power, the representation of executive directors on the audit committee and the non provision of 
financial / accounting expertise of audit committee members. 
 
Notable Weak Corporate Governance Practices in the Nigerian Capital Market 
 
The SEC Code 2003, though a brave move to curb management excesses however had some shortcomings. The 
shortcomings were so noticeable that it prompted the Central Bank of Nigeria to move into action to rescue ailing 
firms especially, the banking sector. These are some examples, in 2009, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) sacked 
the Chief Executive Officers of five Nigerian banks on account of what the bank Governor called poor corporate 
governance practices and non-adherence to the banks’ credit risk management practices. This is brought to the 
foreground because banks are big players in the Nigerian capital market. In 2010, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) sacked the entire management of the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE) on account of issues 
bordering largely on weak corporate governance practices with the SEC particularly alleging that there were 
incredible insider dealings perpetrated by banks in collaboration with the NSE which eventually plunged share 
prices into an unprecedented crash. 
 
In addition, two stock broking firms- Vision Trusts and Investment Limited and AIMS Asset Management Limited 
were suspended from participating in capital market activities by the SEC in 2013. Information from SEC indicated 
that Vision Trust and Investment Limited were suspended as a result of its sale of 131, 868 units and 44, 400 units 
of UBA PLC shares belonging to the estate of a client without mandate. SEC indicated that the firm was given 
several opportunities to restore the shares to the owner, but it failed to do so, hence the suspension (NSE, 2014). 
These and many more prompted the Nigeria Security and Exchange Commission to consider the review of the 
2003 code of corporate governance  ostensibly to improve on existing structure and enhance the performance of 
the board and management and ultimately to increase shareholders funds. 
 
Emergence of 2011 Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria and its Impacts 
 
The Code of Corporate Governance in Nigeria 2011 (2011 SEC Code) issued by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and which became effective on 1st April, 2011, can be said to be the most comprehensive corporate 
governance legislation in Nigeria at the moment. A perusal of the provisions of the 2011 SEC Code reveals that a 
lot of efforts went into the production of the Code. The journey towards the making of the 2011 SEC Code 
commenced in September 2008 with the setting up of the National Committee by the SEC. The Committee was 
charged with the responsibility of reviewing the Code of Best Practices in Corporate Governance in Nigeria issued 
by the SEC in 2003 (2003 SEC Code) with a view to addressing its weaknesses and improving the mechanism for 
its enforceability.  
 
The Committee was further required “to identify weaknesses in, and constraints to, good corporate governance, 
and to examine and recommend ways of effecting greater compliance and to advice on other issues that are relevant 
to promoting good corporate governance practices by public companies in Nigeria, and for aligning the Code with 
international best practices. The stated intention of the SEC in making the 2011 SEC Code is to ensure that the 
Code is consistent with international best practices on corporate governance. Evidently, as can be gleaned from its 
provisions, there was a deliberate attempt to align the provisions of the 2011 SEC Code with international best 
practices on corporate governance.  
 
The birth of SEC Code 2011 has given rise to some gladdened developments. Egwuatu and Nnorom (2013) 
submitted that the reforms and tighter regulations introduced in the Nigerian capital market have enabled market 
activities to be on the rise, with the equities and bond markets on the upsurge (Egwuatu & Nnorom, 2013). In the 
same vein, some initiatives taken by the NSE have put the market back on track, which have triggered appreciable 
growth in the twin market indices. For example, in 2013, SEC withdrew 35 capital market operators’ licenses from 
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the Nigerian Capital Market. More so, in 2013, the equities market consolidated the appreciation of 2012 and 
continues to be among the best performing markets in the world.  
 
According to Oteh (2013), the stock market capitalization almost tripled hitting an all-time high of N12.85 trillion 
before moderating to the level of about N12.06 trillion in 2013. Investor confidence in the market is surging 
evidenced by the increased participation of domestic investors. In the domestic debt market, as a result of reforms 
such as the bond issuance process and introducing rules on book-building and shelf registration. Corporate have 
raised two and half times more from the bond market between 2010 and 2012 than all the corporate bonds raised 
from 1960 to 2009. The year-to-date (YTD), the All Share Index (ASI), of the NSE appreciated by 43.28 percent, 
outperforming 35 percent it did in 2012. The reform also helped in retaining the Nigerian stock market amongst 
the top ten performing exchanges (Egwuatu & Nnorom, 2013).  
 
This therefore shows that well robust corporate governance has the ability to enhance investor confidence and 
trust, attract foreign interests and investment, and demonstrate a country’s commitment to observing international 
standards (Oteh, 2013). Ultimately, from what has been observed thus far as it concerns SEC Code 2011, it can be 
therefore be said that, good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic development by enhancing 
the performance of companies and increasing their access to global capital. Poor corporate governance, on the 
other hand, weakens a company’s potential and may lead to financial difficulties and even fraud. Nigeria has 
therefore taken a giant stride towards benchmarking her codes with international best practices even though 
enforcement still remains largely a challenge. 
 
Although, there have been different positions and arguments of the importance of the SEC Code 2011 to the 
development of the capital market, this has however not been subjected to empirical tests in Nigeria. To our 
knowledge, this would be the first research study to address that lacuna in Nigeria. This study therefore proposes 
the following hypotheses to address the problem and the objectives earlier stated. 
 
H0:  There is no significant positive impact of audit committee financial expertise, audit committee 
independence, board independence, ownership structure on firm market performance in Nigeria. 
 
H0: There is no significant difference in the market performance of listed companies before and after the 
enactment of SEC Code 2011. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODS 
This study made use of both primary and secondary data. That is, it is both survey and empirical research study. 
The population for the primary data composed of all the capital market operators in the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
which is 320 market operators while the populations for secondary data comprised of some selected listed firms 
in the Nigeria Stock Exchange. The primary data was gathered with the administration of questionnaires while the 
secondary data was gathered from the annual reports of the sampled listed firms. In determining the sample size 
for the primary data, the Yaro Yamani (1969) sampling method was adopted. Since the population is a finite one, 
application of statistical formula becomes crucial in determining the sample size. Therefore, after applying the 
formula (see appendix), the sample size became 178. In addition, for secondary data, a sample size of 16 companies 
were selected for the period of  2010 - 2012 in order to determine the pre and post effect of the 2011 SEC Code of 
Corporate Governance on firm market performance.  The statistical test of Pearson Moment Correlation, 
Regression, One Sample T-test and Two Independent T-test were used to analyze the data obtained in order to 
ascertain the overall effect of corporate governance mechanisms on the market performance of listed companies 
in Nigeria.  
 
3.1 Model Specification 
 
The mathematical description of the relationship between market performance of listed companies in Nigeria and 
corporate governance mechanisms is stated below: 
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Table 1. Synopsis of Variables’ Measurement/Description 
 
Names of Variables Acronym Measurement 
 Market Performance (Dependent 
Variables 
  
Share Price SP the price of a single share of a number of saleable stocks 
of a company, derivative or other financial asset 
Volume of Trade VOT the number of shares or contracts traded in a security or 
in an entire market during a given period of time 
Market Capitalization MC It is calculated as share price times the number of shares 
outstanding 
Earnings Per Share EPS It is calculated by dividing profit or loss attributable to 
ordinary shareholders by the weighted average number 
of shares outstanding during the accounting period 
Independent Variables   
Audit Committee Independence ACINDP The number of non-executive directors 
Audit Committee Financial Expertise ACFEXP Number of individuals in the audit committee who are 
experienced in financial knowledge 
Board Independence  BINDP the number of non-executive directors on the board 
Ownership Structure OWNSTR Measure based on 5% substantial shareholdings 
Source: Field Study (2014) 
 
SP= ACINDP + ACFEXP + BINDP + OWNSTR……………………………………………..(1) 
VOT= ACINDP + ACFEXP + BINDP + OWNSTR……………………………………….….(2) 
MC= ACINDP + ACFEXP + BINDP + OWNSTR………………………………………...….(3) 
EPS= ACINDP + ACFEXP + BINDP + OWNSTR………………………………...…………(4) 
 
In regression form, the model becomes: 
SP= β0 + β1ACINDPit + β2ACFEXPit + β3BINDPit + β4OWNSTRit……………………………….……….…..     (5)  
VOT= β0 + β1ACINDPit + β2ACFEXPit + β3BINDPit + β4OWNSTRit …………..….…………….(6) 
MC= β0 + β1ACINDPit + β2ACFEXPit + β3BINDPit + β4OWNSTRit ……………………..….......(7) 
EPS= β0 + β1ACINDPit + β2ACFEXPit + β3BINDPit + β4OWNSTRit ………………….……...(8) 
 
4. ANALYSIS & PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
This section of the study displayed different analyses of results and presentations. The hypothesis stated was tested 
and analyzed using descriptive statistics, correlation coefficient and Panel Least Square. 
 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics for the Population 
 
Variables Year Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
SP 32 24.28566 49.73902 
VOT 32 5320997 9839863 
MC 32 5.72E+07 1.13E+08 
EPS 32 205.9472 281.416 
ACIND 32 2.65625 0.4825587 
ACEXP 32 1.15625 0.9196554 
BIND 32 7.0625 2.25671 
OWNSTR 32 2.09375 1.444888 
Source: Authors’ survey (2015). 
 
The result of the analysis from table 2 showed that the average share price during the period of study was N24 
while the EPS stood at N206. In addition, the table demonstrated that, there were at least three non executive 
directors on the audit committee and at least one of the members if financially literate. In furtherance to that, the 
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table also highlights the number of non-executive directors on the board which is used in the study to measure the 
independence of the board of directors and audit committee. The period was a sensitive period in the economic 
land scale in Nigeria. During this period, eight Chief Executive Officers and the board members were removed by 
the Central Bank of Nigeria as a result of illiquidity. Bad debts soared and the share prices plunged to its lowest 
ebb leading capital flight. This could account for the average of N24 share price and the earning per share. Also, 
the absence of the new reformed SEC Code 2011 which has not come into effect could be attributed to having one 
(1) member with financial literacy on the audit committee board. 
 
Table 3. Correlation Test for Independent variables 
 
Variables  ACIND ACEXP BIND OWNSTR 
ACIND 
 1     
ACFEXP 
 0.0234 1    
BIND 
 0.5897 -0.0888 1   
OWNSTR 
 -0.0079 0.1808 0.0175 1 
Source: Authors’ survey (2015). 
 
The result from the table clearly shows no sign of multicollinearity among the variables because none of the 
variable has as high as 0.8. Gujarati and Porter (2009); Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson (2010) in Ojeka, Asaolu 
and Iyoha (2015) posited that 0.8 is the threshold at which multicollinearity concerns can be detrimental to the 
regression results and make the reliability or the positive power of the model reduced.  
 
4.2 Testing of Hypothesis One 
 
The table above showed the interrelationship between the explanatory variables (i.e. ACIND, ACFEXP, BINDP, 
and OWNSTR) and the dependent variables (SP, VOT, MC and EPS). The table further shows that audit committee 
independence has a significant positive impact on share price (SP), volume of trade (VOT), market capitalization 
(MC) and earnings per share (EPS). The result has a p-value of 0.076 and significant at 5% and 10% level. The 
implication of this is that, the introduction of a non-executive director in the audit committee could increase the 
share price by N15.05023; volume of trade by 381,474 units; market capitalization by N5.38e+07million and the 
earnings per share by 209.2592 kobo. The null hypothesis which stated that, audit committee independence does 
not have significant positive impact on share price, volume of trade, market capitalization and earnings per share 
cannot be uphold and is therefore rejected. In term of audit committee financial expertise, the table demonstrated 
that financial expertise of the audit committee has a significant positive impact on SP, VOT and EPS at 5% and 
10% with a p-value of 0.068, 0.074 and 0.067 respectively. The result also shows that audit committee financial 
expertise significantly impact MC at 1%, 5% and 10% level with a p-value of 0.012. The implication of this is 
that, as the audit committee introduces an additional member with financial expertise, the share price of the firm 
would by implication increased by N7.74; volume of trade would increase by 577,717 units; market capitalization 
by N4.48e+07million and earnings per share increased by 34.81163k. 
 
The null hypothesis which stated that, audit committee financial expertise does not have significant positive impact 
on share price, volume of trade, market capitalization and earnings per share cannot be uphold and is therefore 
rejected. In addition, in term of board independence, there is a significant positive impact of board independence 
on SP, VOT, MC and EPS. The result is positive with a p-value of 0.068, 0.074, 0.012 and 0.067 respectively and 
it is significant at all levels. The implication of this is that, an introduction of an extra non-executive director on 
the board of directors would translate into an increase in share price by N4.95; volume of trade by 354,983.2units; 
market capitalization by N186, 617 and earnings per share by 47.6957 kobo. The null hypothesis which stated that, 
board independence does not have significant positive impact on share price, volume of trade, market capitalization 
and earnings per share cannot be uphold and is therefore rejected. 
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Table 4. Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
  Market performance Measurements (Dependent Variables) 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Sign 
Share Price 
(SP) 
Volume of 
Trade (VOT) 
Market 
Capitalization (MC) 
Earnings Per Share 
(EPS) 
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  
(t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) (t-statistics) 
P-value P-value P-value P-value 
ACIND 
- 
15.050* 
(0.31) 
0.076 
381474** 
(0.49) 
0.063 
5.38E+07** 
(0.76) 
0.046 
209.256** 
(0.98) 
0.035 
ACFEXP 
- 
7.740** 
(-0.43) 
0.068 
577717** 
(1.97) 
0.074 
4.48E+07*** 
(1.68) 
0.012 
34.811* 
(0.43) 
0.067 
BIND 
- 
4.9462** 
(0.51) 
0.0618 
354983*** 
(0.23) 
0.0082 
186.617* 
(0.01) 
0.099 
47.696** 
(1.11) 
0.029 
OWNSTR 
- 
-1.844 
(-0.15) 
0.882 
-199826 
(-1.01) 
0.333 
-66.949 
(-0.37) 
0.718 
-35.461 
(-0.65) 
0.527 
Constant 
? 
-38.126** 
(-0.33) 
0.0746 
-1.11E+07 
(-0.6) 
0.562 
-1.52E+08 
(-0.89) 
0.39 
-669.104 
(1.3) 
0.219 
P-value 
F-test 
R2 
R2 Adjusted 
No of Obs.  
0.0881 
0.29 
0.0942 
-0.235 
32 
0.3447 
1.25 
0.313 
0.063 
32 
0.046 
0.97 
0.260 
-0.0078 
32 
0.028 
1.45 
0.345 
0.1074 
32 
Keys: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 
Note: Numbers in each cell are arranged in the following order- Coefficient, t-values (in parenthesis),  P-values 
and Std β 
Source: Authors’ survey (2015) 
 
In term of ownership structure, the result in table shows that ownership structure has a negative impact on SP, 
VOT, MC and EPS. The result with p-value of 0.882, 0.333, 0.718 and 0.0527 is insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. The implication is that as the percentage of substantial holdings of an average investor increases, share 
price would decrease by N1.844988; volume of trade by 199,8268units; market capitalization by N669, 490 and 
earnings per share by 35.46136 kobo. This finding support the assertion of Von Tadden (1998) where it was 
submitted that dispersed ownership leads to increased market liquidity rather than concentration of ownership. In 
addition, various authors have argued that the distribution of ownership has important implications for the 
efficiency and strategic development of firms (Galbraith, 1967; Marris, 1964; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Williamson, 1964). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) however found no significant relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance. Therefore, null hypothesis which stated that, ownership structure does not have 
significant positive impact on share price, volume of trade, market capitalization and earnings per share is uphold.  
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4.3 Testing of Hypothesis Two 
 
Table 5 demonstrated the significant impact of identified attributes of corporate governance in the reformed 
Security and Exchange Commission Code 2011 on the market performance of firms. Specifically, the table showed 
if the market indicators of performance are better or worse off after the introduction of the SEC Code 2011 
considering the financial issues and other factors militating against the market in Nigeria. From the result therefore, 
it was shown that there is no significant difference in the share price of the sampled firms even after the introduction 
of SEC Code 2011 as the pre mean and post mean result appeared the same. However, by implication, it could be 
deduced that the strength of the reformed corporate governance mechanisms addressed in the SEC Code 2011 
contributed in stabilizing the share price in the market. Even though, generally the share price fell during the period 
as a result of re-organization in the financial market which led to the removal of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
of eight different banks for lack of effective corporate governance practices, the implementation of the Sec Code 
2011 was able to sustain the downturn of the share price and eventually returned investors’ confidence in the 
market. Things could have been different if the SEC Code 2003 was still in place considering the weakness as 
addressed by the then CBN Governor. 
 
Table 5. Two Independent Sample T-tests 
 
Variable Mean Difference Std. Err Std. Dev. t-value 
 
Share Price Pre:        24.32474 10.97687 45.25881 
 
0.0067 
Post:       24.21296 12.70701 52.39235 
 
Volume of Trade Pre:         5229951 2323997 9582086 
 
-0.0548 
Post:        5412044 2373399 9785776 
Market Capitalization 
Pre:       6.70E+07 3.16E+07 1.30E+08 
0.0522 
Post:      4.73E+07 2.08E+07 8.57E+07 
Earnings Per Share 
Pre:        189.7441 67.27559 277.3843 
-0.3417 
Post:           222.15 66.85065 275.6323 
Source: Authors’ survey (2015) 
 
In term of volume of trade, the table showed a significant difference in the volume of trade between the pre and 
post SEC Code, 2011. The table further shows that the mean score for volume of trade is higher in the post SEC 
Code 2011 period than in the period preceding the Code in 2011. The implication of this is that the corporate 
governance variables captured in the Code is more profound and effective in tackling the issue of corporate failures 
in Nigeria and strengthening investor’s and public confidence when compared to previous codes. With respect to 
market capitalization, a significant difference also exists between the Pre and post SEC Code, 2011. It was noticed 
that the pre mean of the market capitalization was lowered that the post mean. The decrease in the post mean 
market capitalization could have resulted from the fall in share price during the period of study. Even though the 
volume of trade increased, there was as sharp decline in the cost per share. Therefore, since the share price has a 
significant impact on the market capitalization, there is likelihood to experience increase when the share price goes 
up and vice-versa. The period of study was a volatile period in the Nigerian capital market. So, the market could 
have sustained a greater decline resulting in a very low capitalization if the 2011 code which guaranteed tighter 
regulations and enforcements has not come to play.  
 
For the earning per share, there was found a significant impact of Code of Corporate Governance of 2011. There 
is a significant difference in the mean before and after the 2011 Code of Corporate Governance on EPS of the 
sampled firms during the period of study. From the findings, the code has helped in strengthening the practice of 
corporate governance by reducing to significant level, the corporate abuses, transparencies, independence and the 
expertise of the board to perform credibly. The cumulative effect is the significant increase in the earning per share 
of the firm thereby discounting the loss of investment recorded in the Nigerian Capital Market during the period. 
 
   International Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2017, Volume 11, Issue 1, 155-164.  
 
International Journal of Economic Perspectives ISSN 1307-1637 © International Economic Society 
http://www.econ-society.org 
163 
 
 
 
4.4 Decision 
 
Based on the empirical analysis as shown in the table 5, the null hypothesis which stated that there is no significant 
difference in the market performance of listed companies before and after the enactment of SEC Code 2011 is 
therefore rejected except for share price which had hitherto in 2010 experienced a sharp decline as a result of CBN 
intervention of rescuing the commercial banks from collapsing and eventual removal of some CEOs for gross 
financial misconducts and abuse of corporate governance practices. The implementation of the code of 2011 helped 
in stabilizing the market by allowing market fundamentals to determine the value of the firm’s share price. 
 
5. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION 
The study investigated the impact of code of corporate governance of 2011 on the market performance of selected 
firms in the Nigerian Capital Market. There have been challenges in the Nigerian financial system that necessitated 
having a more robust, comprehensive and effective Code of corporate governance to ostensibly improve on the 
2003 code that failed to addressed the issue of corporate failures in Nigeria especially in 2010. The idea is to 
restore investor’s confidence in the Nigerian Stock Exchange by promoting transparency, quality of board 
members and ensuring and accountability on the part of the management. The results obtained from the analysis 
indicates that, accounting and financial skills/intelligent of audit committee members is of utmost importance to 
the market performance in term of share price, volume of trade, market capitalization and earnings per share. 
Having this caliber of persons on the audit committee board would give the investors especially institutional 
investors a great confidence that the management would do what is right in term of sound financial 
management/policies. In the same vein, audit committee and board independence in term of the good number of 
non-executive directors as specified in the code of corporate governance 2011 in a clearer term was positively 
signed.  
 
This shows that, the non-executive and independent directors as presently captured in the 2011 code has much 
more guarantee the independence of the audit committee and the larger board which has been saddled with the role 
of providing oversight functions, setting internal control structures, risk management and the guarantee external 
auditors independence. Compare to the 2003 code which have the mixed of executive and non-executive directors 
and sometimes comprise family affiliation where members of the same family are on the board and on the extreme 
having the Chief Executive Director (CEO) as audit committee member. The 2011 codes from the findings of this 
study showed a positive and significant impact on share price, volume of trade, market capitalization and earnings 
per share. In addition, the study also assessed the level of impact of code of corporate governance 2011 on the pre 
and post market performance of sampled firms using the two independent t-tests. The results as shown in table 5 
showed that, the major reforms in the Security and Exchange Commission Code of 2011 in term of audit committee 
independence, audit committee financial expertise, board independence and ownership structure have positive 
impacts on the various indicators of market performance in the post implementation of the SEC Code 2011 when 
compare to the preceding year to 2011.  
 
The results therefore point to the fact that the step taken to overhaul the SEC Code in 2011 has made significant 
contributions to the sustenance of the Nigerian Capital Market and have also increase the relative performance 
listed firms. Policy makers should therefore need to strengthen the implementation of every recommendation 
contains therein to further stabilize the system and repose the confidence of investors both local and foreign in the 
market. For example, the issue of financial expertise, most especially accounting expertise and independence of 
the audit committee members as contained in the SEC Code 2011 has shown by previous researchers that they are 
the major driving force in the corporate governance mechanisms (see Owolabi & Ogbecie, 2010; Ojeka, Iyoha & 
Obigbemi, 2014; Ojeka, Iyoha & Asaolu, 2015). However, even though the SEC Code has achieved some level of 
mandatory compliance, it is recommended that the provisions as contained in the SEC Code 2011 be backed up 
by law. This could be done by incorporating them in the Nigerian Company and Allied Matters Act (hereafter 
CAMA) to ensure strict compliance which if violated, redress could be sought for in the court. It is also 
recommended that, the naming and shaming policy be instituted to enable the public know those firms that are not 
complying with the requirements expressly stated in the code especially in line with the variables identified in this 
study. This would go a long way in assisting current and potential investors to know where to look at in their quest 
for investments opportunities. 
 
This study has major strengths which are visible throughout the study however was not without its limitations 
which however has not affected the results in any way. The identified limitations are to be considered as area(s) 
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for further study in advancing the frontier of knowledge. First, the study did not capture all the listed firms in 
Nigeria though all sectors were represented in the data. Secondly, the corporate governance attributes covered in 
this study is limited to four. This could be further expanded to cover other attributes. The period of study covered 
was between 2010 and 2012, further studies could consider a longer period.  
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